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Abstract
I explore the process of conceptual changes of entities and objects in sci-
ence and how such changes impacts two key issues in the scientific realism
debate: the claim that predictively successful elements of past science
is retained in current scientific theories, and the inductive defense of a
specific version of inference to the best explanation with respect to un-
observables. I provide a case-study of the discovery of radium by Marie
Curie in order to show that the status of an entity can undergo conceptual
changes with respect to its observability and that such changes are rele-
vant for arguments seeking to establish the reliability of success-to-truth
inferences with respect to unobservables.
1 Introduction
There are many points of dispute in the age-old debate between scientific real-
ists and anti-realists. One of them concerns the claim that theoretical content
from past empirically successful theories are retained in current theory. In a
seminal paper against scientific realism, Laudan (1981) showed that scientific
theories could be empirically successful and yet still be false, breaking the es-
sential explanatory connection between empirical success and truth. Entities
postulated in empirically successful but false theories - phlogiston, ether or crys-
talline spheres - were abandoned as science progressed. In response to Laudan’s
argument, contemporary selective versions of realism, for example the ’Divide
et Impera’ realism advocated by Psillos (1999), and the ’working posit’ realism
forwarded by Kitcher (1995), argued that we can infer the (approximate) truth
of theoretical entities posited in science in so far as they are indispensable for a
theory’s predictive success. The shift in focus from whole theories and empirical
success to parts of theories and predictive success filters out many of Laudan’s
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counterexamples and promises the inverse result: theoretical entities that satisfy
these conditions of indispensability for predictive success have not been aban-
doned, but rather retained in the scientific image during theory-change, and
are therefore likely to remain in our future scientific image. Thus, the realist
concludes, we can be realists about these entities. The core of the debate is
whether or not the conditions for explanatory inference set up by the realist
captures the entities (or structures, if you are a structural realist) that have
been retained, or the ones that have been abandoned.
Another point of dispute is the reliability of explanatory reasoning in general,
or the legitimacy of reasoning in accordance with inference to the best explana-
tion (IBE). This form of inference has been argued to be unjustified by virtue
of vicious circularity (Fine, 1991), and that it fails to transmit warrant to the
selected theory because of underdetermination (Stanford, 2006). Realists have
on their part provided various strategies in favor of IBE including explanatory
defenses by Boyd (1983) and Psillos (1999, 2007), as well as inductive defenses
from Kitcher (2001), Douven (2002) and Bird (2006). The core in this dispute
resides in the fact that realists struggle to convince anti-realists that IBE is
reliable on anti-realist terms. Anti-realists, in the form of empiricists, demand
observable confirmation of the reliability of IBE when applied to unobservables.
One can see why this demand has been hard to meet.
In this paper, I address an overlooked issue that has bearing on both these
points of dispute - the conceptual changes that an entity goes through dur-
ing the different stages of the scientific process. Plausibly, entities sometimes
undergo a change with respect to their status in a theory once theoretical or
empirical progress is made. One of the ways in which these changes manifest is
to go from being considered theoretical to being considered empirical, or from
being considered unobservable to being considered observable. Such conceptual
changes can make it difficult to assess whether or not one should categorize
them as abandoned or retained, thus impacting the first dispute. But they may
also provide the empirical confirmation of the reliability of IBE that realists
have been looking for: an entity considered to be unobservable can be inferred
at one stage in the process by virtue of its role as indispensable for predictive
success, only to change into an observable at a later stage, thus confirming the
reliability of the inference. As a case study of the conceptual changes of entities
I use the discovery of radium.
2 The two problems
Much ink has been used in the long and intricate history of scientific realism.
Even though many are familiar with the core arguments, it makes sense to
devote some more inc to give a recapitulation of the arguments central to the
aim of this paper.
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2.1 Are predictively successful entities retained or aban-
doned?
The core of what is known as the ‘Divide et impera’ or selective approach to
realism, championed by Psillos (1999) and to a certain extent Kitcher (1995),
can be viewed as a way to deal with the problem of empirically successful but
false theories in the history of science. Laudan (1981) famously argued that since
there are many examples of theories that were empirically successful but false,
this fact undermines the realist idea that we ought to believe that empirically
successful theories are true and that their entities exist. Entities like phlogiston,
ether and crystalline spheres were once part and parcel of once predictively
successful theories but have since been abandoned, and justifiably so. One of
the ways in which the realist responded to the historical challenge was to argue
that one should not view the empirical success of a theory as a function of the
whole theory, thereby throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Instead, one
should focus on the part of the theory that was indispensable for the predictive
success. If one does, or so the realist say, it will become apparent that these parts
of the theory have actually been retained in succeeding theoretical frameworks:
[...] even a quick glance at current science suggests that there is
a host of entities, laws, processes and mechanisms posited by past
theories - such as the gene, the atom, kinetic energy, the chemical
bond, the electromagnetic field, etc. - which have survived a number
of revolutions to be contained in our current theories. (Psillos 1999,
104)
So, the argument goes, we do have reason to believe that there is a connection
between predictive success and truth, it was just a much more specific connection
than it was previously thought to be. It is important, however, to point out that
the selective realism associated with this move does not generate any general
realism with respect to science or scientific theories - one has to identify which
theoretical parts that essentially contributed to the predictive success of a theory
and then show that, and how, these parts have been retained.
The success of the selective realist strategy is, as Lyons (2006) points out, de-
pendent on two central questions: i) exactly what the criteria are for determining
whether entities or structures in scientific theories are ‘essential’, ‘indispensable’
or ‘responsible’ for novel predictive success (as well as how ‘novelty’ should be
understood), and; ii) whether an answer to (i) is even applicable to any scientific
context. Part of the problem associated with (ii) is that it can be hard to under-
stand when an entity is retained in a succeeding theory. If the understanding
of the entity, as well as (some of) its properties changes when theoretical or
empirical progress is made, does that constitute retaining or abandoning?
2.2 The reliability of IBE
IBE, being an ampliative inference, is always going to be susceptible to fallibil-
ism. Nevertheless, one may argue that it is reliable in the sense that it gets it
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right most of the times. If it does, one may use it to form rational warranted be-
liefs about the world. While there may be many ways to defend IBE, I will focus
on two defenses coherent with the selective realist position: the explanationist
and the inductive defense.
2.2.1 The explanationist defense of IBE
In the 1980’s, Boyd (1983, 1980) provided several different versions of the no-
miracles argument in order to defend scientific realism. The main line of rea-
soning was that realism about scientific theories is the only plausible scientific
explanation for the instrumental reliability of scientific methodology. Boyd’s re-
finement of the NMA focuses on the success of theory-driven scientific method-
ology. The best explanation for this methodological success is, according to
Boyd, scientific realism. Fine (1991) rejects the strategy of defending scientific
realism by using IBE, claiming it to be question-begging and viciously circular:
To use explanatory success to ground belief in realism, as the ex-
planationist defense does, is to employ the very type of argument
whose cogency is the question under discussion. In this light the ex-
planationist defense seems a paradigm case of begging the question,
involving a circularity so small as to make its viciousness apparent.
(Fine 1991, 82)
In response to this explanationist counterpart of Hume’s challenge, Psillos (1999)
uses a distinction between rule-circularity and premise-circularity, claiming that
only the latter is obviously vicious.1 According to Psillos, a premise-circular ar-
gument is one where the conclusion is identical to, or a paraphrase of, one of
the premises in the argument, while a rule-circular argument is one where the
argument is itself an instance of the rule vindicated in the conclusion. (Psillos
1999, 82) The difference between the two, Psillos claims, is that while premise-
circularity must be viciously circular given that the conclusion is presupposed in
the premise, rule-circular arguments are at least not obviously viciously circu-
lar given that the conclusions of ampliative inferences are always stronger than
their premises. He then defends the claim that rule-circular arguments are, in
fact, not vicious. Since, according to Psillos, Boyd’s argument is an instance of
the former, Fine’s objection misses the mark. Recently, Carter and Pritchard
(2017) argues that a further distinction between narrow rule-circularity and wide
rule-circularity provides reason to doubt that rule-circularity of Boyd’s kind is
innocuous. Even supposing that Psillos’ rebuttal of Fine’s argument is sound,
there are grounds to worry about the dialectical efficacy of the explanationist
defense. How is the empiricist supposed to be convinced that IBE is legitimate
when the rule used in the argument arriving at that conclusion is IBE? If you
are an IBE skeptic, you are not likely to accept a justification of it that relies
on IBE, even if it’s not viciously circular. The explanationist defense of IBE
appears, at least in so far as it is meant to convince an empiricist, to be a dead
end for realists.
1This distinction is also present in Papineau (1997), and Boghossian (2001).
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3 The inductive defense of IBE
Prima facie, leaving the explanationist defense for an inductive defense of IBE
has two benefits. First, it does not face any threat of vicious circularity, which
means that it bypasses Fine’s challenge. Second, it promises to be dialectically
useful against empiricists by virtue of using an inference rule that empiricists
accept. I will overview two inductive approaches, and two corresponding ob-
jections to them, which will provide a good basis for evaluating the overall
plausibility of inductive defenses of IBE.2
3.1 The Galilean Strategy
The main proposal in the so called ‘Galilean Strategy’ by Kitcher (2001) is that
we can test whether or not IBE has been successful in observational contexts,
and then generalize that reliability to include unobservable contexts. Thus, the
Galilean Strategy is a two step argument that we may recreate in its generalised
form:
1. IBE is reliable in observable contexts.
2. We have no good reason to suppose that it will stop being reliable in
unobservable contexts.
∴ IBE is reliable in unobservable contexts.
The first step needs to establish the reliability of IBE in observable contexts.
To this end, Kitcher offers a rather plausible set of arguments of the following
sort:
People find themselves in all sorts of everyday situations in which ob-
jects are temporarily inaccessible, or are inaccessible to only some
of the parties. Detectives infer the identities of criminals by con-
structing predictively successful stories about the crime, bridge play-
ers make bold contracts by arriving at predictively successful views
about the distribution of the cards, and in both instances the conclu-
sions they reached can sometimes be verified subsequently. (Kitcher
2001, 176)
Kitcher suggests that when one, in observational contexts where objects are
temporarily unobservable, entertain a host of theories some of them will prove
to be successful and others not. At some later time, when objects are no longer
temporarily unobservable, one will find out which theories that were true and,
according to Kitcher, also find a strong correlation between success and truth.
The core of the argument, then, is that:
2Similar ways of defending IBE inductively have been presented, but not necessarily de-
fended, in Harré (1986), and Douven (2002).
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[...] realists think that everyday experience supports a correlation
between success and truth. They deny that empiricists can simply
stipulate the limits of reliability of this correlation. (Kitcher 2001,
178)
Kitcher’s argument is inductive in so far as the reliability of the success-to-truth
inference is premised on its past successes, where success can be confirmed by
observation. The second step of the argument is that it is ‘metaphysical hubris’
to suppose that IBE’s limit of reliability should happen to correlate with the
limits of human perception.
It is in the second step of the argument where things start to become vexed.
Why, exactly, should the empiricist have to accept that the lack of a defeater
for the continued reliability of IBE from observable to unobservable entities
provide reason to believe that this reliability holds? As Magnus (2003) argues,
the lack of such reasons is not enough to establish that such inferences are
reliable regarding unobservables. Empiricists may simply remind Kitcher that
no inductive evidence for the reliability of IBE with respect to the unobservable
have been presented. While it might be true that there are no reasons to think
that the reliability of IBE stops at the limit of human perception, there are no
reasons to think that it continues either. The reliability of IBE with respect to
unobservables cannot, on Kitcher’s account, be confirmed observationally.
3.2 Bird’s defense
Bird (2006) defends the legitimacy of explanatory inference in science by point-
ing to the fact that being an unobservable is a contingent fact. An inductive
defense of IBE can exploit these contingencies to show that inferences to unob-
servables can be made, and be subsequently confirmed observationally:
[Explanatory] inferences to the existence of unobservables have later
been verified by direct observation once observational techniques
have improved. We can now observe microbes and molecules, the
existence of which was once a purely theoretical, explanatory hy-
pothesis. (Bird 2006, 160)
The argument draws on the fact that technological progress has increased our
epistemic boundaries so as to allow previously unobservable entities to become
observable, suggesting that we can actually observationally confirm inferences
to unobservables.
Bird’s argument seems to contain precisely the element that was lacking in
Kitcher’s - the success of IBE with respect to unobservables. As a means to
convince the empiricist, however, it fares poorly. The cases clearly lack observa-
tional confirmation of the success of IBE with respect to the unobservable, even
supposing that IBE is successful. Bird references successful inferences to mi-
crobes and molecules, but those are precisely the kind of entities that empiricists
would say are unobservable. Such instances of IBE, while possibly successful,
cannot be shown to be successful on empiricists terms.
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3.3 The problem with inductive defenses of IBE
It is now clear what the underlying problem of the inductive approach to defend-
ing IBE really is: the strategy of providing successful inferences to unobservables
implies a failure of confirmation of that success by observation. The strategy
of providing observational confirmation of successful inferences implies a fail-
ure to apply observational confirmation to unobservables. We may think of the
inductive defense as amounting to two claims:
(A) Instances of IBE with respect to unobservables have been successful.
(B) Confirmation of inferential success can be obtained by observation.
For the inductive defense to work against the empiricist, both (A) and (B)
must be the case. It’s easy to see, however, that if (A) is satisfied then ¬(B)
must be the case. Conversely, if (B) is satisfied then ¬(A) must be the case.
This is because whatever epistemology that one may proceed with in order
to satisfy (A), it couldn’t possibly be (B) given an empiricist understanding of
observability. Starting from the methodological assumption that (B) is satisfied,
there is no possible route that would lead to satisfying (A). The very specific
class of inferences that realists need to be reliable - inferences to unobservables
- cannot be observationally confirmed. To argue for the general reliability of
IBE, of which inferences to unobservables would be a subset, would run in to
two objections. The first objection is the classic empiricist rebuttal of sheep
and lambs. There is no reason for empiricists to venture beyond what the
actual evidence, in this case successful inferences with respect to observables,
shows. Even if any epistemology available shows that IBE is a generally reliable
mode of reasoning, empiricists simply do not have to accept that this entails the
reliability of IBE with respect to unobservables. It is entirely possible that the
reliability of IBE is context-dependent and restricted to observables, and there
is no evidence of the sort empiricists accept that can show that this possibility
is false. The second objection, targeting Kitcher’s defense, is that a generalized
defense of IBE would imply that metaphysicians using IBE in their theorizing
would be as justified as scientific realists are. In other words, there would
be no way to stop the metaphysical inflation of scientific realism, given that
metaphysicians use IBE. If IBE is generally reliable, there is no reason for why
this reliability shouldn’t extend to metaphysics as well.3 Between these two
objections, a generalization of the reliability of IBE appears to be a too costly
route to venture for realists.
We may now take stock of the defenses of IBE I have considered. The ex-
planationist defense was charged with vicious circularity because it uses IBE as
a rule to justify the claim that IBE is justified. Even if Psillos and others have
argued that this rule-circularity is not to be conflated with its vicious premise-
circular cousin, the defense will ultimately suffer from dialectical issues. Perhaps
3This line of argument have been expressed by many metaphysicians which aim to establish
the epistemic legitimacy of metaphysics by reference to scientific realism. See Paul (2012),
Swoyer (2008), and Colyvan (2012, 2006).
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such a strategy is effective against someone who is on the fence with respect to
IBE, but anti-realists in general, and constructive empiricists in particular, are
not. The inductive defense of IBE came in two different forms. Kitcher’s defense
tried to establish the reliability of IBE by testing it in an observable environ-
ment, a move the consequences of which opponents would have to accept. Once
this reliability could be established, the defense was supplemented with an ar-
gument claiming that since we have no reason to think that reliability of IBE
correlates with observation, IBE is reliable with respect to the unobservable.
Bird’s inductive defense claimed that we may observe the successes of IBE with
respect to unobservables when observational technology enables us to catch up
with our inferences. As we have seen, Bird’s defense neglects the empiricist
epistemic divide between observable/unobservable and so cannot prove the al-
leged success of IBE with respect to unobservables without begging the question
against the empiricist. Kitcher’s defense suffers from the inverse problem. He
can prove the success of IBE, but only with respect to observables.
The empiricist distinction between observable and unobservable appears to
be insurmountable for a dialectically successful defense of IBE. Any evidence
for the reliability of IBE with respect to unobservables must somehow contain
successful inferences to unobservables that can be observationally confirmed. A
tall order, to say the least.
4 Conceptual changes of entities
One move in Bird’s defense of IBE was to employ the shift in the status of an en-
tity from unobservable to observable related to different technical improvements.
Even though the claim that microbes and molecules are observable would not
suffice to convince the empiricist, the shift is an interesting phenomena worth
exploring. Is it really the case that unobservable entities are destined to remain
unobservable? Or can they sometimes convert into observables? The interesting
class of entities that realists claim we ought to be realists about are precisely
those that are indispensable for a theory’s predictive success, so in this context
a theoretical entity should be construed as whatever entities that occupy the
intersection between unobservables and theoretical entities.4
In what follows, I claim that objects posited by theories based on IBE have
transitioned from being considered unobservable to observable. The reasoning
here departs from Bird in the sense that I aim to bridge the dialectical gap be-
tween realists and empiricists by staying within the boundaries of observability.
The challenge is to provide a case of successful use of success-to-truth inferences
to unobservable entities such that those inferences can be observationally con-
firmed. There are, in fact, many contenders for this sort of case. Consider the
4We need not be concerned with entities that are unobservable but do not figure in sci-
entific theories, such as spirits or ghosts, since such objects are not claimed to exist by the
realist. Similarly, we need not be concerned with entities that figure in scientific theories but
are observable, like Zebras or metal, since these are precisely the entities that realists and
empiricists agree are real.
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inferred missing elements by Mendelejev from his original model of the periodic
table. According to Mendelejev, the gaps in his model corresponded to actual el-
ements (Stewart 2019). Eka-aluminium, eka-boron, and eka-silicon were in this
sense unobservable entities at the time, given that no information about the
observability of the elements were available - the observability of the elements
were dependent on the specific physical and chemical properties of the elements.
Though they may have been detectable at the time, detection is not sufficient
for empiricist commitment. The inferred elements were simply placeholders
with values assigned by the structural properties of the model. The subsequent
discovery and production of these missing elements, given the names Gallium,
Scandium, and Germanium respectively, prompted a conceptual change with
respect to these elements from unobservables entities to observable ones. The
process of the conceptual change of Gallium went via detection to observation,
since the first evidence for its existence was obtained by spectroscopic analysis,
before subsequent observable evidence in the form of a sample of the free metal
was obtained by electrolysis. I will focus on a particular instance of such a case
- the discovery of radium - and its affinity with explanatory reasoning.
5 A case study of the discovery of Radium
When looking at the history of the discovery of radium, it is clear that its
postulation entered when trying to explain an unexpected parameter value in an
experiment. When quantifying the levels of radiation of uranium by measuring
the level of electric current in an apparatus (an electrometer with a piece of
piezo-electric quartz) Marie Curie saw that the pure uranium sample was less
radioactive than the mineral compound from which the uranium was refined.
The unexpected levels of radiation could be accommodated if the compound
contained an unknown additional radioactive element that was discarded in the
process of extracting the uranium. The line of reasoning here is very much akin
to IBE, inferring the existence of a novel element based on the fact that it would
explain the data. At this stage, the element is hypothesized, but is crucially still
an unobservable element in the sense that no proper detection or observation of
it had been made. As was custom at the time, any claim regarding the existence
of novel elements had to be subjected to spectroscopic analysis. If there really
was a new element, evidence of this would show up in the analysis. The Curies
took their samples to spectrum specialist Eugène-Anatole Demarçay, who found
a strong line in the spectrum at 3814.8 Ångström, concluding that:
It does not seem possible to me that this line can be attributed to
any known element [...] Neither barium nor lead from elsewhere
[i.e. from sources other than the Curies’ material], as I have assured
myself, give any line which coincides with it. (Demarçay 1898, 175-
178)
At this point, one may associate the hypothesized element with a measured em-
pirical value - the lines in the spectroscope. In other words, there is an isolated
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frequency at a certain value in the spectrum not attributable to any known
element. There is a clear sense in which the hypothesis at this point enjoyed a
certain degree of predictive success – the hypothesis predicted the presence of a
unique line associated with a unique wavelength (although not an exact location
in the spectrum). In addition, the hypothesis could accommodate previously
known phenomena such as the results from the electrometer experiment. The
results from Demarçay’s analysis prompted the Curies to make an inference
from the success of the radium hypothesis to its truth:
The various reasons which we have just enumerated lead us to believe
that the new radioactive substance contains a new element to which
we propose to give the name radium. (Curie et al. 1898, 1216)
At this stage, the inference is made very clearly, and a certain degree of predic-
tive success for the hypothesis had been established. We can see how confidence
in the truth of the hypothesis correlates with its increasing empirical success.
Despite the predictive success associated with the spectroscopic results, the
scientific community at the time disagreed with the Curies’ conclusion. The
existence of radium had to be conclusively demonstrated. The Curies famously
labored for years in a make shift laboratory trying to isolate a quantity of pure
radium chloride. In August 1902, after processing over 8 tons of the ore pitch-
blende discarded from mines in St. Joachimsthal, Marie and Pierre Curie had
finally produced one decigram of pure radium chloride, the unique glowing prop-
erties of which confirmed its existence. Marie Curie and André Debierne would
some years later also manage to isolate radium in its metallic form from a solu-
tion of radium chloride using electrolysis, adding to the total conceptual change
of radium from unobservable to observable. (Ropp 2012). The specific point
about the radium-case is that the Marie and Pierre Curie empirically tested the
radium hypothesis by making radium observable in the empiricist’s sense rather
than by extracting characteristic numbers and testing those empirically.5
6 Implications for realism
The radium case shows that entities can undergo a series of conceptual transfor-
mations as a theory progresses, which shows that unobservable entities are not
doomed to end up at the scrapyard of science, but are not retained as unobserv-
able entities in subsequent theoretical frameworks either. Importantly, these
changes matter a great deal to the progress of science and the epistemic sta-
tus of entities in science. Empirical regularities have corresponding underlying
causes. Sometimes, these causes are observables and sometimes they are not.
5The radium-case is by no means a unique story. The discovery of helium had a similar
structure, where Norman Lockyer in 1868 inferred the presence of a new element - helium -
from a unique line in the spectrum of light from the sun. This inference was confirmed in
1895 by Sir William Ramsey. Many thanks to John Norton for bringing the similarity between
these cases to my attention.
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Inferences to those causes are made by experts in the field, with relevant back-
ground knowledge of facts which restrict theory space with respect to possible
explanations for the regularities. When inferred causes are successfully used to
generate novel predictions, the scientists know their inference was good. Fallible,
perhaps, but justified nonetheless. The evidence for the warrant of this infer-
ential practice can be clearly seen in cases where entities conceptually change
as theories develop. The immediate intuition about cases of entity-change is
that they may be used by the realist in order to show how explanatory infer-
ences to once unobservable entities can be observationally confirmed. After all,
this looks precisely like the kind of evidence that an inductive defense of IBE
needed. An inference from the predictive success of an entity to its existence
is made that can be observationally confirmed once the entity has changed to
an observable. Under the assumption that realists can show that in most cases,
IBE has been able to pick out the relevant entities prior to their change, their
much needed justification of IBE with respect to unobservable entities can be
inductively defended. I will not consider the obvious objection against the fea-
sibility of amassing enough cases for a proper induction. Since my aim is to
show that there are no conceptual or logical issues that prohibits using cases of
entity-change as the base in an inductive defense of IBE, I will instead focus on
two possible objections to that claim. The first is that the conceptual change
in observability constitutes a version of a failure of referential stability during
theory change. The second is that the radium-case shows that radium was an
observable all along, so could not constitute a successful case of success-to-truth
inference to unobservables. I will address both objections in order.
6.1 An empiricist objection
One troubling aspect of realism is how to deal with entities during theory change.
This argument is applicable to the context of entity-changes as well. If an entity
changes from unobservable to observable, which is what realists would argue in
this case, then the object which is picked out by the term ‘radium’ is not the
same object before its observation as after. In other words, empiricists would say
that once an entity is observable, it is fundamentally a different entity. Radium
as an unobservable, or theoretical postulate, is abandoned, while radium as
an observable is discovered. So what should the realist say about radium? Is
it a successful instance of a case where predictive success and indispensability
led to radium being retained? Or is it in fact the case that radium as an
unobservable entity became abandoned once its observability became known?
The first inference to the existence of an additional element did not contain
any reference to observability and selective realists must make it clear that
there is sufficient overlap in how the scientists perceive the entities in order to
substantiate the claim that such entities are retained through the different stages
in the scientific process. There is a straightforward answer to this challenge. The
only conceptual change that radium went through via the process of producing
observable quantities of it was precisely that it was observable. The stability of
the hypothesis did not depend on radium being observable since all features of
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radium could have been identified without generating an observable amount of
it. Observability is not a sufficient criterion for distinguishing between entities
and so cannot be used to separate pre-observed radium from post-observed
radium in order for referential instability to ensue.
6.2 Another empiricist objection
The empiricist may object and say that the radium-case is not all it promised to
be, since the entity in question was an observable all along. If we could observe
it, which Curie showed that we can, then it is clearly an observable. This means
that the inference was to an observable all along, and so cannot constitute a
case for the reliability of IBE with respect to unobservables. This is essentially
a slightly altered re-run of Magnus (2003) argument against Kitcher. The ques-
tion is whether it makes sense for a constructive empiricist to say that radium
was an observable at the time when it was considered to be an unobservable
entity. In order to claim that it was observable all along, empiricists need to say
that observability is objective, or factive, i.e. a relation that holds between hu-
mans and entities whether we know it or not. We might call this notion ‘factive
observability’ and say that an object is observable iff its observability follows
from a set of facts about the actual world. We may distinguish factive observ-
ability from ‘epistemic observability’, where the latter denotes our knowledge
about these facts, or our knowledge about what is observable. Since epistemic
observability is a subset of factive observability, they are not denoting the same
things: objects can be observable in the factive sense without being observable
in the epistemic sense, as the radium-case clearly demonstrates. Now, empirical
adequacy says that we should believe what science tells us about observables,
but in what sense of observable? Monton and van Fraassen (2003) seems to
prefer epistemic observability:
Consider the claim ‘if the moons of Jupiter were present to us (in
the right kind of circumstances) then we would observe them’. [...]
The way to understand the claim is to note that, even though it is
a counterfactual, it is entailed by facts about the world: facts that
the moons of Jupiter are constituted in a certain way, and facts that
we are constituted in a certain way. These facts can be disclosed
by empirical research. In practice, not all the empirical research
has been done, so we have to rely on our current best theories to
determine what these facts are. (Monton and van Fraassen 2003,
415)
Monton and van Fraassen (2003) seem to agree about the distinction between
factive and epistemic observability. While I see no problem in determining the
observability of objects when we have knowledge about the facts that entail
their observability, what should we say about objects which are observable ac-
cording to some set of facts which are not yet available to us? Before 1902,
nobody had access to the facts that entailed that the constitution of radium
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made it observable, so radium would not have been considered an observable
at the time. This means that the success-to-truth inference was operating ”in
the blind” as it were. No facts about the observability of radium entered in
the inference machinery, and yet the inference was successful. Furthermore, if
empirical adequacy is supposed tell us what we should believe, but furnishes
those beliefs with observables only once we know that they are observable, it’s
hard to see what philosophical and epistemic benefits constructive empiricism
offer over its näıve counterpart. The break with näıve empiricism is precisely the
commitment to the observable rather than to the observed (Contessa 2006), but
basing observability on what we know to be observable collapses the distinction
between them.
Perhaps empiricists can say that radium was factively observable all along.
The observability of radium follows from certain facts about its constitution,
for example that its halv-life is long enough, which would suffice to run the
empiricist objection. There are, however, strong reasons for empiricists not to
use factive observability. If they do, it follows from empirical adequacy that
scientists should have believed in the existence of radium even before they knew
that it was observable. In other words, they should have believed in the existence
of an entity that at the time was considered unobservable. But applied to our
current theories, this is precisely the dispute that empiricists have with realists -
whether or not to believe in the existence of currently postulated unobservable
entities. To use factive observability as a guide to ontological commitment
implies belief in (some) entities currently considered unobservable. Surely this
goes against the spirit of constructive empiricism.
7 Summary
One of the core issues in contemporary scientific realism is how to convincingly
argue for the reliability of IBE with respect to unobservables. In this paper,
I provided a diagnosis of the problems facing different such defenses of IBE as
well as a possible solution for how to deal with them. The solution, building
on work by Bird, was to look more closely at cases in the history of science
where explanatory inferences from predictive success to truth were made to en-
tities which subsequently underwent conceptual changes from unobservable to
observable. This move was able to bridge the dialectical gap that Bird’s defense
of IBE could not. As a case-study, I used the history of the discovery of radium
by Marie Curie, which contained explanatory inferences from predictive success
to truth prior to the time where she established the observability of radium. The
case showed that success-to-truth inferences to unobservables can be successful
in a way that ought to be dialectically efficient against the empiricist. Two
potential empiricist objections to the radium-case as an instance of an obser-
vationally successful success-to-truth inference to unobservables was considered
but were either too weak or coupled with internal problematic implications for
the empiricist.
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